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Abstract
How do the liquidity functions of banks aﬀect investment and growth at diﬀerent stages of
economic development? How do ﬁnancial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with
the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations
growth model where agents experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. By pooling liquidity
risk, banks play a growth-enhancing role in reducing ineﬃcient liquidation of long term
projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show
that middle-income economies may ﬁnd it optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while
poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system.
Therefore, middle-income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their
development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a ﬁnancially safe, long-run
steady state.
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Resumen
¿C´ omo afectan las funciones de liquidez llevadas a cabo por el sistema bancario a la
inversi´ on y el crecimiento en diferentes etapas del desarrollo econ´ omico? ¿C´ omo evoluciona
la fragilidad ﬁnanciera y los costos de crisis bancarias con el nivel de riqueza de una econom´ ıa?
En este documento se analizan estas cuestiones utilizando un modelo de crecimiento en el que
los agentes enfrentan incertidumbre idiosincr´ atica de liquidez. El sistema bancario juega un
papel promotor del crecimiento al reducir la necesidad de liquidaci´ on ineﬁciente de proyectos
productivos de largo plazo. Sin embargo, el sistema bancario puede enfrentar crisis de liquidez
con importantes p´ erdidas en el producto. Se muestra que para los bancos de los pa´ ıses de
ingreso medio puede ser ´ optimo estar expuestos a crisis de liquidez, mientras que los pa´ ıses
pobres y ricos tienen mayores incentivos a estar cubiertos contra estas crisis.
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This paper investigates the relationship between the liquidity roles of banks, ﬁnancial fragility
and economic growth. It integrates the analysis of liquidity crises into the analysis of the
long-run growth eﬀects of ﬁnancial intermediation.
The development of a banking system to pool liquidity risk allows economies to achieve
higher growth rates and higher long-run levels of wealth and consumption. However, a bank-
ing system may be vulnerable to liquidity crises with potentially large output and welfare
consequences in the short run. We show that suﬃciently rich economies can aﬀord the cost
of full coverage against the risk of liquidity crises, while middle-income economies may ﬁnd
it optimal to remain vulnerable in exchange for higher returns and welfare. This can explain
why ﬁnancial development in middle-income countries is associated with both a higher growth
and a higher frequency of banking crises.
A large number of empirical studies support the existence of a positive relationship between
ﬁnancial intermediation and growth. King and Levine [1995] and Beck, Levine and Loayza
[2000] ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of the relative size of the banking sector, and several measures of
ﬁnancial development on per capita output growth.1 On the other hand, the banking crisis
literature has pointed out the role of ﬁnancial liberalization and the rapid increase in ﬁnancial
depth as good predictors of ﬁnancial crises.2 Loayza and Ranciere [2001] attempt to reconcile
the apparent contradiction between those two strands of the literature. They show that a
long-run positive relationship between ﬁnancial intermediation and output growth can coexist
for some countries with a negative short-run relationship, specially for those countries that
have suﬀered ﬁnancial crises episodes.
Table 1 : Real Income Per Capita and Systemic Banking Crises
1
Income Quartile Number of systemic banking crisis





Total 32 100%  .
1/ average 1975-1998 GDP per Capita, 1995 US dollars.
2/ source: Caprio and Klingebiel (1999).
1Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) use an external instruments approach to address the issue of joint endo-
geneity between ﬁnancial development and growth.
2See for example Demirguc-Kunt and Degatriache [1998 and 2000]; Gourinchas, Landerretche and Valdes
[1999]; Kaminsky and Reinhart, [1999].
1Table 1, presents information on the level of income per capita and the number of banking
crises.3 Countries are divided in quartiles according to their level of GDP per capita. The
table shows that the highest frequency of banking crises is for middle-income economies.
Moreover, emerging economies have not only experienced higher recurrence of banking crises
but also more severe costs. This is shown in Figure 1, which plots the cumulative ﬁscal cost
of banking crises (as percentage of GDP) for countries ranked according to their average per
capita income. The severity of the banking crises has been much higher for middle-income
economies than for poor and rich economies.



















































































Countries with a systemic banking crisis experience
 ranked by Income per Capita
source: Caprio and Klingebiel (1999).
Financial intermediaries play several roles that can increase depositors’ welfare and foster
economic growth. This paper focuses only on allocating and liquidity functions of banks. In
particular; ﬁnancial intermediaries: (i) provide an eﬃcient mechanism that channels savings
into those investments with the highest returns; (ii) are eﬃcient suppliers of liquidity (can
transform illiquid assets into liquid liabilities); and (iii) provide liquidity insurance that
eliminates idiosyncratic liquidity risk.4 We study what are the costs and beneﬁts of these
3Caprio and Klingebiel deﬁne a systemic banking crisis as a situation where aggregate capital of the banking
sector has been exhausted.
4Most of the existing literature on ﬁnancial intermediation and growth focus on other functions of ﬁnancial
2liquidity functions on welfare and growth of the economy, and how they change in the process
of economic development.
We use an intertemporal model of ﬁnancial intermediaries to analyze the dynamics of
wealth, capital and consumption. The model embeds a modiﬁed version of the Diamond and
Dybvig [1983] model of liquidity provision (henceforth DD)5 into an overlapping generations
model (Diamond [1965]). There are two technologies available, a short-term storage technology
and a long-term technology. In this paper, the long-run technology uses a standard Cobb-
Douglas production function with labor and capital as inputs. This technology constitutes the
channel for growth over time and among generations.
As has been noticed by Cooper and Ross [1998], the original Diamond-Dybvig solution
does not consider the impact of the possibility of runs on the design of the optimal deposit
contract or the bank’s investment portfolio. In this paper we characterize the optimal deposit
contract oﬀered by a competitive bank when panic runs can occur with positive probability,
and we show how this contract changes with the level of wealth of the economy.
The possibility of bank runs occurring with positive probability aﬀects the design of the
contract oﬀered by the bank. It involves a decision between being covered (that is, invulnerable
to panic runs) and taking the risk of being exposed to liquidity crises. Covered banking is
possible at the cost of lower liquidity insurance, while exposed banking has the cost of possible
crises episodes. The welfare and growth implications of these two types of arrangements will
depend on the probability with which crises can happen, and on the level of wealth of the
economy.
The characterization of the optimal banking system constitutes the key result of this paper:
for suﬃciently high probabilities of crises, a covered banking system would be optimal for any
level of wealth; for lower probabilities, poor and rich economies would opt for a covered banking
system, while middle-income economies would chose an exposed banking system; ﬁnally, when
the risk of runs is small enough, poor and middle-income economies will choose to be exposed
to liquidity crises. Nevertheless as long as the probability of runs is positive, there will be a
level of wealth above which a covered banking system would be optimal.
intermediation; such as the pooling of risk among diﬀerent investment projects, specialization, adoption of new
technologies, etc. See for example Greenwood and Jovanovic [1990], Saint Paul [1992] and Acemoglou and
Zilibotti [1997].
5The modiﬁed version of the Diamond-Dybvig model emphasizes the distinction between liquidity insurance
and liquidity provision in the role of banks.
3The analysis of the optimal banking system has important implications for economic
growth. Those economies that choose an exposed banking system take on the risk of short-run
output losses of crises to enjoy the higher liquidity insurance and possible higher returns. Nev-
ertheless, as they get richer, they can eventually "escape" ﬁnancial vulnerability and converge
to a long-run, ﬁnancially-safe steady state.
The comparison of optimal banking and the benchmark of autarky yields two results.
First, the optimal banking system always dominates autarky in terms of welfare of the current
generation of depositors, independently of the probability of runs. Second, even if at early
stages of economic development the provision of liquidity insurance imposes some growth costs,
once the economy has crossed a certain wealth threshold, the development of the banking
system has unambiguously positive growth consequences.
Finally, we show that the output losses suﬀered by an exposed system in case of a run
are more severe for middle-income economies than for poor and rich economies. This feature
replicates the empirical pattern on the costs of banking crises (see Figure 1).
Some previous literature has studied liquidity provision by ﬁnancial intermediaries in an
intertemporal framework. In particular, Bencivenga and Smith [1991], Ennis and Keister
[2003], Qi [1994] and Fulghieri and Rovelli [1998] have studied the DD model in an overlapping
generations frameworks. Ennis and Keister [2003] is the closest work to our paper, since it is
the only paper we are aware of that considers the possibilities of bank runs in a growth model.
However, Bencivenga and Smith [1991] and Ennis and Keister [2003] consider an endogenous
growth model with constant returns to capital. Under this assumption, the role of ﬁnancial
intermediation is no longer dependent on the level of wealth, and ﬁnancial intermediation is
always growth enhancing. Qi [1994] and Fulghieri and Rovelli [1998] focus on intergenerational
transfers and not on growth; their model has technologies with constant returns to capital and
is an endowment economy without wealth dynamics and no capital accumulation.6 Even when
these authors recognize the presence and potential importance of a bank run equilibrium, none
of these models incorporate ﬁnancial crises in their analysis.
Our results of the mapping between the level of development and the vulnerability to
crises have some similarities with Acemoglu and Zilibotti [1997]. In their model, uncertainty
is suppressed above a certain level of wealth through full diversiﬁcation, while in our model a
suﬃciently rich economy can aﬀord the cost of full coverage against crises.
6In our model, the use of a Cobb-Douglas technology, for the long asset, makes the returns to investment
endogenous, and the banking solution (optimal investment and liquidation policy and liquidty insurance)
dependent on the wealth of the economy.
4The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the general set up of
the model: the structure of the overlapping generations, the preferences, and the technologies
available. Section 3 studies the optimal investment portfolio and growth under ﬁnancial
autarky. Section 4 characterizes the optimal banking system and studies the distortions
generated by the possibility of crises and the dynamic implications of banking. Section 5
analyzes the consequences of a banking system, ﬁrst by comparing the economy with a banking
system with the economy under autarky, and then by analyzing the output cost of banking
crises. Finally, section 6 confronts our results with the empirical evidence, concludes and sets
an agenda for future research.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
The economy consists of an inﬁnite sequence of overlapping generations. In each period, a
generation, composed of a continuum of ex-ante identical agents with unit mass, is born; there
is no population growth.
Agents live for two periods. They have an endowment of one unit of labor during the ﬁrst
period of their lives, which they supply inelastically. Agents do not value consumption when
they are young. During the second period of their life they are subject to a time preference
shock. With probability π, an agent only values consumption when middle aged (the beginning
of her second period), and becomes an early consumer. With probability (1 − π), she only
values consumption when old (the end of her second period) and becomes a late consumer.
The shock is stochastically independent across agents, and is private information to the agent.
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Risk averse agents would like to reduce the ex-ante gap between early and late consump-
tion. Given the CRRA preferences the level of liquidity insurance attained by a ﬁnancial
arrangement is proportional to the ratio of consumptions (cE
cL).
5There is one good, used for consumption and investment. There are two technologies
available. First, there is a storage technology that uses the good as the only input and, for
each unit invested at t, gives a return of one unit in any sub-period of t +1 .T h e r ei sa l s oa
long-term technology with a Cobb-Douglas production function, which uses labor l and capital
k as inputs.7 Capital fully depreciates after being used in production. If the technology is left
until full maturity (the end of the period), it gives the return:
z(k,l)=Akβl1−β (2)
Since the unit of labor is supplied inelastically, deﬁne the capital intensive production function
by:
f(k) ≡ z(k,1) = Akβ
This production can be prematurely liquidated, with a liquidation cost. With premature
liquidation output produced is a fraction γ, 0 <γ<1, of the full return at maturity, i.e.,
γf(k). Hence, the liquidation cost of the long-term technology is expressed in terms of output
and not in terms of capital. This assumption makes the relative marginal returns of a long
project left until maturity and liquidated prematurely a constant (
f 0(k)
γf 0 (k) ≡ 1
γ).8
An example helps to better illustrate this liquidation technology. We can think about this
technology as a crop. It is irreversible in terms of the original capital invested (seeds). If it is
left until full maturity, it yields the maximum size of the crop; however, premature liquidation
would yield crop that is not fully grown. Finally, the amount of labor required both at the
planting and at the harvest is the same, and it is independent of the timing of the harvest.
Deﬁne the return of holding the long asset as the function h(k) ≡ βf(k). Hence, the
marginal return of the long investment is h 0(k) if the investment is maintained until full
maturity, and γh0(k) if it is liquidated prematurely. Let’s deﬁne the two following capital
levels:
k such that γh0(k)=1
k such that h 0(k)=1
7To motivate the diﬀerences of the two technologies, we can think that the country is a small open economy
with access to domestic production (the long technology) and to an international asset (the short technology)
that has constant returns to investment (see Velasco and Chang [2000]).
8The results of the paper are robust to a broad range of speciﬁcations about concavity of the two technologies.
In particular, the liquid technology may pay g(x) units on both subperiods, for x units invested, as long as
t h e r ei sat r a d e - o ﬀ b e t w e e nl i q u i d t ya n dr e t u r n( i . e . ,f(·) must be more concave than g(·)). This trade-oﬀ is
justiﬁed because otherwise the liquid technology would dominate the long technology. The robustness analysis
is available upon request.
6Since labor is inelastically supplied, the long-term asset presents diminishing returns to
capital. Figure 2 describes the marginal returns of the technologies as functions of the level
of investment. For low levels of capital (k<k ), the marginal return of the long-term asset,
even when it is prematurely liquidated, exceeds the marginal return of the storage technology
(γh0(k) ≥ 1). Beyond some level of investment in the long asset (k>k), its marginal return
is lower than one (h 0(k) ≤ 1).
Factor markets are competitive, so each input is paid its realized marginal product. How-
ever, the realized marginal product depends on the ﬁnancial arrangement in place because it
depends on the proportion of long-term projects liquidated.
Wages received at the end of period t represent the unique source of wealth for members
of the generation. After receiving wages, agents make investment decisions before observing
the realization of their liquidity shock. Since agents do not value consumption when young,
the consumption-saving decision at t is trivial, and they will invest their full wealth either
directly in the two technologies (autarky), or as bank deposits (ﬁnancial intermediation).9
In the two following sections we present two ﬁnancial arrangements: ﬁnancial autarky
and the competitive banking solution. Financial autarky is a benchmark to compare the
welfare and growth costs and beneﬁts of ﬁnancial intermediation. In this case, agents have
to insure themselves against future liquidity needs. In the second case we develop a general
banking solution, where the ﬁnancial intermediary provides liquidity and liquidity insurance
to depositors. Under this arrangement, the idiosyncratic liquidity shock is private information
to the agent, and the bank has to oﬀer incentive compatible allocations. However, even when
a truth revelation mechanism is in place, panic bank runs are still possible, and the optimal
demand deposit contract must consider the bank’s expectations about the probability of a
panic.
3F i n a n c i a l A u t a r k y
Under ﬁnancial autarky, young agents make their investment decision between storing goods
and investing in capital on their own. We adopt a simplifying assumption about the structure
of the economy. We assume that each worker supplies her unit of labor to a continuum of
9This is an important diﬀerence from the OLG model of Diamond (1965). We abstract from the
consumption-saving decision to stress the choice among assets with diﬀerent liquidity.
7representative ﬁrms with mass ψ ∈ (0,1].10 Under this assumption, young workers are paid a
wage equal to the expected marginal product of labor wt+1 =( 1− β)[πγ +1− π]f(kt)11 and,
at the same time, the investors (old agents) receive the marginal product of their investment-
liquidation decision (γβf(k) if early consumer and βf(k) if late). The results under ﬁnancial
autarky are taken from Gaytan and Ranciere [2005].
3.1 The optimal individual investment decision
In the absence of ﬁnancial markets, agents cannot get insurance against idiosyncratic liquidity
risk. Investment in capital is risky in the sense that its return will depend on the realization of
the liquidity shock. Agents’ investment choices will determine the level of consumption they
will enjoy under each state of nature. At the end of their ﬁrst period, for any given level of
wealth w>0, a typical agent of generation t, chooses investment in the long technology k to
maximize:
πu(cE)+( 1− π)u(cL) (3)
subject to 0 ≤ k ≤ w (4)
where cE = w − k + γh(k),c L = w − k + h(k),a n dt h ed i ﬀerence between wealth and capital
(w − k), represents investment in the storage technology.z
The following proposition characterizes the optimal solution for members of any given
generation under ﬁnancial autarky:
Proposition 3.1 For every level of wealth w, t h eu n i q u es o l u t i o n( kopt(w),c E(w),c L(w))t o
the agent’s problem under autarky is characterized by the following conditions:














10This mass ψ can be arbitrarily close to zero; however, this is equivalent to assuming that every worker
works for all ﬁrms.
11This assumption avoids the possibility of heterogeneity among consumers, that complicates the presentation
of the model . Nevertheless, all the results of the paper are robust to this heterogeneity, and the proof is available
upon request.




0 <k opt(w) <w
cE = w − kopt + γh(kopt)
cL = w − kopt + h(kopt)
(interior solution)





Proof. Gaytan and Ranciere [2005] Proposition 4.1.
The optimal solution under autarky is ineﬃc i e n t . T h es o u r c eo fi n e ﬃciencies is that, in
the absence of ﬁnancial markets, each agent needs to insure herself against any liquidity need
she may face. In poor economies self insured agents invest, as precautionary savings, their full
wealth in capital beyond the point where it is eﬃcient to do so. When the marginal return
of the short asset exceeds the marginal liquidation value of the long asset, (γh0(w) < 1), it
would be eﬃcient to start investing a fraction of wealth in the short asset. However, w∗ >k
means that for any level of wealth between k and w∗ agents are over-investing in the long
asset (k = w), although γh0(w) < 1.
For levels of wealth greater than the threshold w∗,as e c o n di n e ﬃciency arises. Early con-
sumers are forced to liquidate productive investments to cover their liquidity needs, while late
consumers ﬁnance some of their consumption by using the less productive liquid investment.
The impossibility of receiving insurance through ﬁnancial markets generates an ineﬃcient
liquidation of the long investment. Therefore, when w is very large investment in capital is
bounded above by kmax (h0(kmax)= 1
πγ+(1−π) > 1), while it is eﬃcient to invest up to the




For low levels of wealth, when agents are investing only in the long technology, liquidity self
insurance is constant (cE
cL = γ). For higher levels of wealth, when agents are investing in both
assets (w>w ∗), an increase in wealth reduces the gap between early and late consumption.
Nevertheless, full liquidity risk insurance is not possible under ﬁnancial autarky.
3.2 The dynamics of wealth, capital and consumption under autarky
We can now characterize the steady state of the economy and study the evolution of wages,
capital and consumption towards this stationary equilibrium. Since capital fully depreciates
after it is used, the connection between the individual problem and the dynamics of the
intertemporal model is given by wages of the next generation:
wt = Fa(wt−1)=( 1− β)(πγ +1− π)f(k(wt−1)) (5)
kt = k(wt−1)=kopt(wt−1)
9The following proposition characterizes the dynamics of this economy :
Proposition 3.2 (convergence and the steady state) The economy converges towards a
unique stable steady state
_
w
a > 0 and k(
_
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Proof. Gaytan and Ranciere [2005] Proposition 4.2.
Figure 6, in section 4.2, presents the dynamics of wealth under autarky. Beyond the
threshold w∗, the rate of growth decreases rapidly, since overinvestment in the previous region
has already exhausted the marginal returns on capital. A constant level of liquidation π,
due to self insurance, becomes more and more costly in terms of growth. Finally, as both
consumptions (cE,c L) are monotonically increasing in wealth, their dynamics follow the
dynamics of wealth.
4 Intra-generational Risk Sharing: the Optimal Banking Sys-
tem
All liquidity uncertainty in this economy pertains to the liquidity needs of individuals, and it
is idiosyncratic. Therefore, welfare gains are possible via a mechanism of liquidity preference
insurance. In addition, under ﬁnancial autarky the mismatch between ex-post liquidity needs
of the agents and the timing of highest returns of the assets, generates an ineﬃcient allocation
of aggregate resources. Financial intermediaries can provide welfare improvements by pooling
liquidity needs and by ﬁnding an eﬃcient balance between the agents’ preference for insurance
and the timing of the highest returns on the assets.
However, since liquidation is costly, if the value of the bank’s assets at the early sub-
period cannot cover the total withdrawal of deposits, the bank is vulnerable to a panic run. A
ﬁnancial crisis driven by a panic appears as a coordination problem in which late consumers
believe that the bank won’t be able to service all deposits in the late sub-period, driving a
total run on the bank at the beginning of t+1. The optimal deposit contract is inﬂuenced by
the possibility of a ﬁnancial panic. The bank faces a tension between improving the welfare of
depositors, by oﬀering higher returns and liquidity insurance, and having a more vulnerable
system. If the bank could assign a probability to the event of a ﬁnancial panic, it could ﬁnd
the most eﬃcient balance between these two objectives. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) do not
consider the eﬀect of the possibility of bank runs on the optimal risk sharing contract and
the optimal portfolio of the bank. Nevertheless, the DD solution is a benchmark because it
is the best risk sharing possible if the liquidity shocks were observable. We will refer to the
10DD contract and investment portfolio as the ﬁrst best or unconstrained optimal risk sharing
solution.
In this section we develop the optimal risk sharing solution when the bank assigns a ﬁxed
probability to a ﬁnancial panic. The unconstrained optimal risk sharing appears as a limiting
case of the general problem (in the limit when the probability of a panic tends to zero). This
benchmark is useful to determine the distortions generated by the existence of unobservable
shocks and the existence of a positive probability of a ﬁnancial panic.12
4.1 Generation t Optimal Risk-Sharing
We consider a generational bank that pools resources and maximizes expected utility of current
depositors, which is equivalent to a competitive banking system that maximizes proﬁts. Since
the t-bank pools labor income from the agents w, on the aggregate, all liquidity uncertainty
disappears: by the law of large numbers, the bank knows that a proportion π of agents will
demand their deposits in the early sub-period, and a proportion (1 − π) in the late sub-
period. Therefore it can oﬀer a deposit contract that promises a ﬁxed payment cE for the
beginning of period t +1 , and cL for the late sub-period of t +1 . To provide the optimal
risk sharing contract the ﬁnancial intermediary chooses the investment portfolio k,a n dt h e
optimal liquidation policy. Since the relative marginal returns of the assets vary with the
level of wealth, it may be optimal to transfer resources between sub-periods: the bank can
liquidate a proportion λ of the long asset, to serve early consumers, and it can keep in storage
an amount i of the short asset, or "excess liquidity", for late consumption. This policy is
aimed to form the most eﬃcient match between the liquidity needs of agents and the highest
returns of the assets. Since the type of agent remains private information, a self-revelation
mechanism is necessary to make the contract incentive compatible. Whenever the contract
oﬀers higher consumption in the late sub-period (cE ≤ cL), patient agents have an incentive
to wait until the full realization of the assets’ returns.
Existence of a Bank Run Equilibrium
At the beginning of t +1those agents that claim to be early consumers withdraw their
deposits, and the bank is forced to liquidate any amount of assets required to satisfy their
demand. The remaining assets are left to matureu n t i lt h es e c o n ds u b - p e r i o dt os e r v el a t e
12In our model all the ongoing projects are ﬁnanced with investment of the older generation alive, therefore
any risk sharing can only be done among members of the same generation. Qi [1994], Fulgueri and Rovelli
[1998] and Bhattarcharya et.al. [1998] allow for overlapping investors, however, their focus is on optimal risk
sharing between generations without reference to growth.
11consumers. The implication of the liquidation cost on the long technology is that the value
of the bank’s total portfolio at the early sub-period, (cR ≡ w − k + γh(k)) is lower than the
value if the technologies were left to mature as planned (w−k+(λγ +1−λ)h(k)). When all
consumers withdraw their deposits according with their true type, the bank faces a demand of
πcE in the early sub-period. However, if all late agents misrepresent their type and withdraw
early, the bank has to meet a total demand for resources of cE. Once late agents have learned
their type they face the decision between waiting and receiving a share of the remaining assets
in the late sub-period, or claim to be early consumers and withdraw their resources from the
bank. Whenever the bank has enough resources in the early period to satisfy any withdrawal,
the dominant strategy for late consumers is to wait. Therefore, a run strategy can only be
optimal if the value of all liabilities in the early sub-period exceed the liquidation value of the
banks portfolio, that is if:
cE >c R ≡ w − k + γh(k) (6)
If (6) holds, and the contract is incentive compatible, there are two possible equilibria: a honest
equilibrium where agents withdraw from the bank according with their true type, and a run
equilibrium where all agents withdraw their deposits, pretending to be early consumers. In
the run equilibrium the bank declares bankruptcy and distributes any remaining assets among
claimants following a bankruptcy rule. We assume that the bank has to give the same amount
to consumers reporting at the bank at the same time. By (6), such a service assumption
implies in the run equilibrium a pro-rata distribution of assets: the bank divides equally the




A maximizing bank must necessarily realize that a contract for which (6) holds makes it
vulnerable to panic runs, and this fact will aﬀect the design of the contract. The question
of how the equilibrium is selected when both equilibria are possible is crucial to determine
how it aﬀects the choice of the optimal contract. In the absence of additional uncertainty, it
is not clear what drives expectations about the future solvency of the bank. In this paper
we assume the most basic equilibrium selection mechanism:14 a sunspot. We assume that
13In the honest equilibrium, agents don’t care about their position in the bank line, as there are enough
assets to serve them all the promised amount cE. By contrast, in case of a run, all agents want to be "ﬁrst in
line" and thus they will show up at the bank at the same time. The example of the recent run on Argentinian
banks in 2002 is illustrative: all agents who where waiting in front of the bank before the opening were allowed
to withdraw an equal fraction of their deposits.
14Several authors have studied bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon (Postlwaite and Vives [1987], Jacklin
12there is a publicly observable variable that inﬂuences the agents’ level of "optimism" about
the solvency of the bank. Suppose that with probability q the variable takes values that lead
to a pessimistic assessment about future solvency. Nevertheless, pessimistic expectations can
lead to a ﬁnancial crisis only when the bank is vulnerable.
4.1.1 The Bank’s Problem
Let θ ∈ {0,1} be the state variable of a bank run. If θ =1late agents withdraw the deposits
in the early sub-period, and if θ =0all agents make their withdrawals according to their type.
Let η be the probability of a bank run given the optimal contract and investment portfolio. If
the contract makes the bank solvent under any circumstance in the early sub-period (cE ≤ cR)
it is not optimal to run, even if all other late agents run (η =0 ). On the other hand if (6)
holds the probability of a bank run is the probability of pessimistic expectations (η = q).
At any period t, and for any given level of deposits (wealth w>0), a representative bank of
generation t-depositors chooses k,λ,i,cE,c L to maximize expected utility of a representative
current depositor:15
V (η,w)= m a x
k,λ,i,cE,cL
(1 − η)[πu(cE)+( 1− π)u(cL)] + ηu(cR) subject to: (7)
πcE ≤ w − k − i + λγh(k) (8)
(1 − π)cL + πcE ≤ w − k + λγh(k)+( 1− λ)h(k) (9)
cE ≤ cL (10)
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (11)
0 ≤ k ≤ w (12)
0 ≤ i ≤ w − k (13)





Pr(θ =1 |k∗,λ ∗,i ∗,c ∗
E,c ∗
L)=0 ⇔ cE ≤ cR
Pr(θ =1 |k∗,λ ∗,i ∗,c ∗
E,c ∗
L)=q ⇔ cE >c R
(15)
and Bhattacharya [1988], Cooper and Ross [1998], Allen and Gale [1998], Golfajn and Valdes [1997]). These
papers either assume an exogenous probability of crises, or neglect the possibility of panic-based runs. In
a recent paper Goldstein and Pauzner [2001] tackle the problem of equilibrium selection and endogenize the
probability of bank runs. Based on the ideas of global games developed by Carlsson and van Damme [1993],
and Morris and Shin [1998] the authors show that the existence of aggregate uncertainty and imperfect and
asymmetric private information, can select a unique equilibrium in the static DD model.
15The bank centralizes production and pays a wage to the following generation (w
0) equal to the realized
marginal product of labor w
0 =( 1− β)(λγ +1− λ)f(k).
13Equation (8) is the resource constraint at the early sub-period of t +1 ; for serving agents
with early liquidity needs, the bank can liquidate part of the short asset (w − k − i)a n da
proportion λ of the long-term technology. Equation 9 is the resource constraint at the late
sub-period of t +1 ; the bank uses all its remaining assets to serve late consumers. Since
agents still have access to the storage technology, the bank must oﬀer a higher return to
patient consumers (the incentive compatibility constraint (10)). Finally, the probability of a
bank run (equation 15) given the optimal contract is equal to the sunspot probability if the
bank is vulnerable to a crisis, and zero otherwise.
The bank’s problem can be decomposed into two decision problems that provide insights
about the tensions and distortions of the optimal contract generated by the possibility of crises.
The bank can oﬀer two alternative types of contracts. Under the ﬁrst type of contract, termed
"covered banking”, the ﬁnancial intermediary chooses a contract that makes it invulnerable
to crisis (cE ≤ cR ⇒ η =0 ). The returns on deposits under this contract are independent of
the realization of the sunspot. Under the second type of contract, termed "exposed banking”,
the bank takes on the risk of having a run on its deposits (cE >c R ⇒ η = q). 16 For any
given level of wealth, the bank determines ﬁrst the optimal contract for each type and, in the
second stage, it selects the type of contract that maximizes expected utility.17 This second
decision is equivalent to choosing the probability with which a crisis will occur (η).
The optimal covered banking contract Oc = {kc,λ c,i c,c c,c c} solves the problem:
V c (w)= m a x
k,λ,i,cE,cL
πu(cE)+( 1− π)u(cL) subject to: (Ps)
(8), (9), (11), (10), (12),(13), and
cE ≤ w − k + γh(k) (16)
where (16) is the run-preventive constraint.
The optimal exposed banking contract Oe = {ke,λ e,i e,c e,c e} solves the problem:
V e (q,w)= m a x
k,λ,i,cE,cL
(1 − q)[πu(cE)+( 1− π)u(cL)] + qu(cR) subject to: (Pc)
(8), (9), (11), (10), (12),(13), and (14)
16Using the terminology of Cooper and Ross (1998), "covered banking” corresponds to "run preventive
contracts” and "exposed banking” to "contracts with runs”.
17It is important to notice that the ”covered banking” contract may be optimal, and it is not impossed as
prudential regulation of banks.
14In the second stage of the problem, the bank chooses the contract that gives the larger
expected utility, which is equivalent to choosing η =a r g m a x {V (η,w)} between the two
contracts, where V (η,w)=Max{V e (q,w),Vc (w)}.
The analysis of the tensions and distortions generated by run-proof contracts, under cov-
ered banking, and by a positive probability of a run, under exposed banking, require the
deﬁnition of an eﬃcient benchmark. We consider the intra-generational ﬁrst-best solution, in
which a planner (or bank) can observe the realization of the liquidity shock. This solution
is equivalent to the limiting case of exposed banking when the probability q tends to zero.18
Using this benchmark we can make assessments about the distortions of the two banking con-
tracts in terms of technology (investment capital k), liquidity provision (λ and i) and liquidity
insurance (cE
cL).
The General Shape of the Solutions.
Before presenting the ﬁrst-best, covered and exposed contracts, it is possible to characterize
the general shape of the solution. Technological considerations on the returns of the assets
deﬁne four regions (A to D) depending on the level of wealth for the three solutions. Although
the thresholds that deﬁne these regions diﬀer among the three contracts, we deﬁne the generic
thresholds: k, ˜ wj,a n dˆ wj where j = {u,c,e} is an index for the unconstrained or ﬁrst-best
solution, the covered banking and exposed banking solutions, respectively.
Region A: No investment in short-term technology, no liquidity provision.
For poor economies (w ≤ k) investing in capital dominates investing in the short asset
because the marginal return is higher even if it is liquidated. Therefore, all wealth is invested
in the long technology (k = w), and early consumption is served by liquidating a constant
proportion of its asset (λj is constant). Notice that the optimal portfolio is the same as under
autarky. Since the optimality of full investment in capital is a technological consideration, the
optimal portfolio, and the threshold of the region is common to all solutions.
Region B: Constant level of investment in capital, reduction of early liquidation,
increasing liquidity provision.
For k≤ w ≤ e wj the ﬁnancial intermediary invests in both assets and provides extra
liquidity. The deﬁning characteristic of this region is that investment in capital is kept ﬁxed
at k. All optimal solutions keep the marginal return of the long asset ﬁxed at a high level,
18The two contracts are equivalent because in the absence of aggregate uncertainty the incentive compatibility
constraint is never violated.
15where its value, when liquidated prematurely, equals the marginal return of storing the good.19
Even for a constant level of the capital stock, output can grow because the bank is liquidating
a decreasing proportion of the long asset (λj is decreasing in wealth). The bank starts using
the liquid asset as a source of liquidity to pay out early consumers, reducing premature
liquidation of the long asset. Late consumers are served using an increasing proportion of the
fully matured output.
Region C: No liquidation of long term investment, increasing investment in both
assets.
When wealth has crossed a certain threshold (w ≥ e wj), the ﬁnancial intermediary stops
using the long asset to serve early consumers. All the long technology is left until full maturity
(λj =0 ) to serve late consumers, and investment in capital can increase again. If there
is no crisis, early consumption is served only using the short asset (c
j
E = w−kj
π ), and late




1−π ). Increasing investment in capital
over this region implies that the marginal return of the asset used to serve late consumers
decreases relative to the return of the asset used for early consumption.
Region D: No liquidation of long term investment, and excess liquidity.
For high levels of wealth (w>ˆ wj) high investment in capital has exhausted the marginal
return of the long asset, and it is optimal to transfer some returns of storage to serve late
consumers (ij ≥ 0). Over this region there is no early liquidation of the long technology
(λj =0 ).



















We present ﬁrst the main features of the eﬃcient benchmark (4.1.2). Then we characterize
the optimal covered (4.1.3) and exposed banking (4.1.4) contracts. Section (4.1.5) presents
then the optimal banking system as the bank’s choice between these contracts.
4.1.2 The Eﬃcient Benchmark: Unconstrained Optimal Risk Sharing
Gaytan and Ranciere [2005] characterize the unconstrained optimal risk sharing solution in
Proposition 5.1. The main implications for investment, liquidation policy and liquidity insur-
19Two assets can be used to serve the same type of consumption only if their marginal returns are the same
at the required moment of liquidation.
16ance are presented in the following table:
w ku λu iu cE
cL
A 0 <w≤k w λ∗ 0 γ
1
σ
B k≤ w ≤ e wu k λu(w) 0 γ
1
σ
C e wu ≤ w ≤ ˆ wu ku (w) 0 0 h0 (ku)
− 1
σ
D w ≥ ˆ wu k 0 (1 − π)(w − k) − h(k) 1
where e wu, ˆ wu, λ∗, λu(w) are deﬁned by:20




















σ +( 1− π)γ
(19)




The eﬃciency of the unconstrained solution can be summarized by the following conditions:
Technological eﬃciency:
(i) There is full investment in capital whenever the early liquidation marginal return on
capital exceeds the marginal return on storage (k = w ⇔ γh0 (k) > 1);
(ii) whenever there is liquidation of the long technology, capital investment never exceeds k
(if λ>0 ⇒ γh0 (k) ≥ 1);
(iii) when wealth is large enough (w ≥ ˆ wu) the bank fully exploits the marginal return on
capital (k = k).
Liquidity eﬃciency:
(iv) There is never ineﬃcient liquidation of the long technology (if γh0 (k) ≥ 1 ⇒ λ>0);
20The deﬁnition of the unconstrained threholds e w
u and ˆ w
u is presented in the Appendix. k
u (w) is a







17(v) whenever the marginal return of capital at maturity exceeds the marginal return on
storage there is no excess liquidity (if h0 (k) > 1 ⇒ i =0 ).
Eﬃcient liquidity insurance:
(vi) Whenever there is early liquidation of the long asset (λ>0), liquidity insurance is kept
constant at a level that equates the marginal rate of substitution with the marginal




(vii) whenever γh0 (k) < 1, an increase in capital investment is optimally associated with an
increase in liquidity insurance;
(viii) excess liquidity is held (i>0)o n l yt om a k ea ne ﬃcient transfer from the early to the
late subperiod to provide perfect insurance (if i>0 ⇒ cE
cL =1 ).
An important question is whether a bank that oﬀers a contract that replicates the ﬁrst-
best solution is vulnerable or not to panic runs. If the ﬁrst-best solution is run proof, it must
be the optimal contract chosen both under covered and under exposed banking; therefore,
it must be the optimal banking solution. There is the following relationship between risk
aversion and invulnerability of the ﬁrst-best solution.
Proposition 4.1 (Optimal risk sharing and bank runs) (i) If σ>1 (high risk aversion),
the unconstrained risk sharing solution is vulnerable to crises (cE >c R).
(ii) If σ ≤ 1 (low risk aversion), there exists a unique level of wealth wrp ∈ (e wu, b wu),s u c h
that:
— if w ≤ wrp, the unconstrained risk sharing solution is run proof (cE ≤ cR)
— if w>w rp, the unconstrained risk sharing solution is vulnerable to crises (cE >c R).
where wrp = krp(1 +
πγ





Proof. See Appendix A.
Impatient agents (σ>1) have a stronger preference for liquidity insurance and demand
higher early pay-oﬀ,m a k i n gt h eﬁrst-best contract vulnerable to runs. Patient agents (σ ≤ 1),
on the other hand, prefer to enjoy higher payoﬀs on late withdrawals while the marginal returns
are still high. However, as wealth increases and liquidity insurance improves, the economy
18reaches a point where the optimal risk sharing solution becomes necessarily vulnerable to
runs.21
For 0 <w≤ wrp and σ ≤ 1, the ﬁrst best solution is the optimal covered bank contract
and is also the optimal banking solution. For higher levels of income, the optimal contracts
are subject to the optimality conditions that prevail for σ>1. Therefore, we can concentrate
our attention on the results for high risk aversion (σ>1).
4.1.3 Covered Banking (η =0 ).
Before presenting the optimal covered contract, it is useful to notice that the autarkic solution
is run proof (ca
E = w −k +πγh(k) <w−k +γh(k)). A covered bank could always replicate
the autarkic solution by setting λ = π, k = ka,a n di =( 1− π)(w − k) and, therefore, optimal
covered banking will necessarily dominate the autarkic outcome.
Proposition 4.2 The optimal covered banking contract for high risk aversion (σ>1)i s
characterized by the following conditions22:
Region w
u0(cE)
u0(cL) kc λc ic
A 0 <w≤k 1
γσ w π 0
B k≤ w ≤ e wc 1
γσ k λc(w) 0
C e wc ≤ w ≤ ˆ wc 1
γσ kc
C (w) 0 0






D (w) 0 (1 − π)(w − kc) − πγh(kc)
where the thresholds e wc, ˆ wc, liquidation policy λu(w) , and investment ks (w) are given by:





















π +( 1− π)γσ
πγ +( 1− πγ)γσ (22)




kc (w) is implicitly deﬁned by the marginal rate of substitution
u0(cE)
u0(cL) and excess liquidity
ic.23
21Improving insurance and the existence of a wealth level above which the economy is vulnerable to a run,
represent a diﬀerence with respect to the original DD model. In their original framework of ﬁxed returns to
assets, low risk aversion (σ ≤ 1) implied that the optimal risk sharing contract was necessarily run proof.
22Figure 3 illustrates the optimal choice of capital and liquidity insurance for a simulation of the economy
23k
s
C (w) and k
s
D (w) are two continuous, strictly increasing and concave functions of w (see Appendix).
19The source of distortions in covered banking is the limit imposed on the degree of liq-
uidity insurance. The unconstrained level of liquidity insurance violates the run preventive
constraint; therefore, a covered bank will provide a strictly lower level of liquidity than the
ﬁrst best. The incentive to increase early consumption towards the ﬁrst-best level implies
that the run-preventive constraint binds for all levels of wealth cE = w − k + γh(k). This
limit on early consumption forces the bank to provide a constant level of liquidity insurance
over regions A, B and C (cE = γcL), below the eﬃcient level. Lower liquidity insurance frees
resources to provide higher late consumption either through reducing liquidation or increasing
capital investment.
Over regions A and B, since capital is determined by pure technological considerations
(k = w and k = k), a lower liquidity insurance implies a smaller liquidation of the long asset
λc (w) <λ u (w).24 In addition the bank stops liquidating the long asset at lower levels of
wealth ( e wc < e wu). This reduction in liquidation increases the marginal product of capital
and has a positive eﬀect on economic growth. Once the covered economy has stopped early
liquidation of the long technology starts increasing capital. However, over region C, the
increase in capital is not accompanied by an increase in liquidity insurance. Over region C
and the ﬁrst part of D, the bank ”over-invest” in capital with respect to the ﬁrst-best level
to maintain a covered contract. In the second part of region D, there is underinvestment
in capital relative to the ﬁrst-best, as ”excess liquidity” i>0 becomes a more eﬃcient way
to restrict liquidity insurance. The use of excess liquidity before fully exhausting the return
on the long asset (h0 (k) < 1) is a technological ineﬃciency of covered banking. Over region
D, the bank can maintain a covered contract and increase liquidity insurance, reducing the
distortion generated by the run-preventing constraint.
Making a banking system ”safe” implies restricting both the banks’ asset portfolio, and the
provision of liquidity insurance oﬀered by the deposit contract in a way that banks can always
satisfy any claim by depositors. In the previous literature, a requirement of excessive liquid
reserves can attain this objective. However, when returns are endogenous it is not necessarily
the case. We ﬁnd that, except for rich economies, it is more eﬃcient to reduce the promises to
early consumers rather than to hold more liquid assets. This reduction of liquidity insurance
allows the bank to allocate more resources to long term projects, with positive consequences
for economic growth.
24Over region A, λ = π, the safe contract just replicates the autarkic solution.
204.1.4 Exposed Banking (η = q).
Proposition 4.3 The optimal exposed banking contract for high risk aversion (σ>1)i s
characterized by the following conditions.25
w
u0(cE)
u0(cL) ke λe ie
A 0 <w≤k 1
γ w λ∗ 0
B k≤ w ≤ e wu 1
γ = h0 (k) k λu(w) 0
C e wu ≤ w ≤ ˆ we h0(ke) −
q
1−q (1 − γh0 (ke))
u0(cR)
u0(cL) ke
C (w) 0 0
D w ≥ ˆ we h0(ke) −
q
1−q (1 − γh0 (ke))
u0(cR)
u0(cL) ke
D (w) 0 (1 − π)(w − ke) − πh(ke)
where ˆ we is given by:







β (1 − π)






q +( 1− q)(π +( 1− π)γ)
σ
γq +( 1− q)(π +( 1− π)γ)
σ (24)
ke




D (w) is implicitly deﬁned by the marginal rate of substitution and excess liquidity ie.
Regions A and B of the exposed contract are identical to the intra-generational ﬁrst-best
solution. Since over these regions the level of investment is determined by technological eﬃ-
ciency, it is optimal to provide the ﬁrst-best level of liquidity insurance, because a reduction of
liquidity insurance helps only if it makes the contract run proof (covered banking); otherwise,
crises are still possible. As a consequence, for this range of wealth an optimizing bank will be
restricted to maximize utility under the good state of no-crisis only.
Exposed banking introduces an important new element. Having crises with positive prob-
ability generates aggregate uncertainty in the payoﬀ for both types of consumers. The bank
will have incentives to smooth consumption over realizations of the aggregate state. This
”banking self-insurance” against crisis risk is achieved by increasing the payoﬀ in the bad
state, that is, by increasing the early liquidation value of the bank’s portfolio. Since the early
value of the portfolio increases with investment in the storage technology, the bank will invest
less capital than the optimal risk sharing over regions C and D.26
There is no conﬂict for the exposed bank between increasing liquidity insurance and in-
creasing crises self-insurance. A promise of higher early consumption adds extra liquidity,
25Figure 4 illustrates the optimal choice of capital and liquidity insurance for a simulation of the economy
26In region C of the unconstrained problem, the marginal cost of increasing capital was just u
0 (cE),t h e
valuation in terms of utility of the marginal return of storage. When crises occur with positive probability the












, and starts providing full liquidity insurance at a
lower level of wealth ( ˆ we < ˆ wu).
Excess liquidity (i>0) is used to provide full insurance, although the marginal product
of capital is not the same as that of storage. Since the marginal return on capital has not
been completely exhausted (h0 (k) > 1), the bank will continue to increase capital as wealth
increases over D.27
Therefore, a maximizing bank that faces a positive probability of a run, will increase
the level of liquidity and liquidity insurance beyond the ﬁrst-best solution increasing the
vulnerability of the system and reducing the growth beneﬁts. Although this ”excessive risk”
result resembles those coming from a moral hazard problem, the distortion is not a consequence
of insurance received, but of insurance provided. In eﬀect, by increasing liquidity the bank
is providing crisis insurance. At the cost of lower returns, a more liquid system reduces the
output loss in case of a crisis, because it increases the bankruptcy value of the bank.
A ne x p o s e db a n kn e v e r” overinvest”. At low levels of wealth (regions A and B), capital
and growth are the same as under the unconstrained solution. For higher levels of wealth, the
risk of a run reduces the level of investment, with negative consequences for economic growth.
4.1.5 The Optimal Banking System
In this section we characterize the optimal risk-sharing solution when there is an exogenous
probability of pessimism that can drive a panic run on the bank as the choice between the
optimal”covered” and ”exposed” contracts. For any given level of wealth, the ﬁnancial in-
termediary will choose the contract that maximizes expected utility. The bank’s decision
reﬂects the tension between crisis prevention and precautionary measures to minimize the
costs of a possible crisis. The ﬁnancial intermediary chooses η =a r gm a x {V (η,w)},w h e r e
V (η,w)=Max{V e (q,w),Vc (w)}.










because investment in capital also reduces consumption in case of a total run.










q(1 − γh0 (ke))
that is a similar expression to the autarkic condition for self-insurance against liquidity risk.
22Since the distortions generated by the contracts vary with the level of wealth, the optimal
choice between the contracts will depend on wealth, and on the probabilty of a bad realization
of the sunspot. The expected utility of covered banking (V c (w)) is invariant to q,w h i l et h e
expected utility of the exposed contract (V e (q,w))i ss t r i c t l yd e c r e a s i n gi nq.T h e c h o i c e
between the two contracts will be determined by a wealth-dependant, cut-oﬀ probability
q∗ (w). This threshold probability is deﬁn e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gp r o p o s i t i o n .
Proposition 4.4 The Optimal Banking System
F o ra n yl e v e lo fw e a l t hf o rσ>1,a n df o rw>w rp,w h e nσ ≤ 1, there exists a unique
cut-oﬀ probability q∗ ∈ (0,π] such that:
q>q ∗(w) ⇔ a covered banking system is optimal
q<q ∗(w) ⇔ an exposed banking system is optimal
where q∗(w) is a continuous function deﬁned by:
V e (q∗ (w),w)=V c (w)
Proof. See Appendix A
Over regions A and B the optimal exposed contract replicates the ﬁrst-best contract;
therefore, there are no distortions in the contract, and the only cost is the expected cost of
a run. This cost increases with q and, therefore, the expected utility is decreasing in q. Over
regions C and D, a positive probability of a run q increases the liquidation risk, reducing the
expected marginal return of capital and investment.
Lower capital investment has two eﬀects on expected utility: a positive eﬀect because
it increases liquidity insurance, and a negative eﬀect because it reduces the returns for late
consumption. The overall eﬀect is negative, because the bank is increasing the expected payoﬀ
in case of a run at the cost of reducing it when there is no run, exacerbating the distortion in
the non-run case.28 Over regions C and D, every dollar kept for crisis self-insurance pays less
in terms of utility than a dollar invested to increase the payoﬀ in the good equilibrium.
In Appendix B, we show that if the probability of the sunpot is higher than the probability
of the idiosyncratic liquidity shock (q>π ), autarky dominates the exposed banking solution.




= −[πu(cE)+( 1− π)u(cL)] + u(cR) < 0.
23Since covered banking weakly dominates the autarkic outcome, the cutoﬀ probability q∗ (w)
must be strictly lower than π.
The cutoﬀ probability determines the bank’s optimal choice of contract for any given level
of wealth. However, it is useful to invert the problem and ﬁnd, for a given probability of
the sunspot, how the decision between the two contracts changes with the level of wealth.
This analysis sheds light on how the choice of risk taken by an exposed bank varies over the
development path, or equivalently it provides a broad picture of the cross-sectional distribution
of risk for countries with diﬀerent levels of wealth.
Proposition 4.5 Optimal Banking and the Level of Wealth.
There exist two cutoﬀ probabilities q0,q 1 (0 <q 0 <q 1 <π ) such that:
(i) high probability of a run: if q>q 1, a covered banking system is the optimal for all
levels of wealth
(ii) intermediate probability of a run: if q0 <q<q 1, there exist two levels of wealth
wl <w h such that an exposed banking system is optimal for middle income economies
(wl <w<w h) and a covered banking system is optimal for poor and rich economies
(w ∈ R+ − [wl,w h])
(iii) low probability of a run: if q<q 0, there exist one level of wealth wh such that an exposed
















q1 = Max{q∗ (w)} <π
δwl
δq > 0; δwh
δq < 0 and lim
q→0
wh =0
Proof. See Appendix A
Figure 5 illustrates the characterization of the optimal solution in proposition 4.5. For any
probability of the pessimistic state q , it shows the upper and lower wealth thresholds (wh
and wl)t h a td e ﬁne the switch between the two contracts:








Figure 5: The Optimal Banking System 



















Case (iii)  Case (ii) 
Optimal: Exposed Banking 
Optimal: Covered Banking 
Case (i) 
qzero  qone 
Optimal: Covered Banking 
Optimal: Covered Banking 
Optimal: Exposed Banking 
For poor economies, the cost of covered banking is the low liquidity insurance provided
by the intermediary; however, the cost is partially compensated because lower liquidation
increases late consumption. On the other hand, since the exposed banking replicates the
unconstrained solution, the cost of exposed banking is the cost of a run. Therefore, poor
economies will prefer a covered contract when the probability of the pessimistic state is high
enough (q>q 0).
The underinsurance distortion of covered banking becomes more pervasive for higher levels
of wealth. Liquidity insurance is kept constant even when the return of the long asset is
decreasing. In addition, the covered bank eventually uses excessive liquidity (i>0)t os a t i s f y
the run-preventive constraint, although the returns to the long assets are not fully exhausted
(h0 (k) > 1).
On the other hand, an exposed contract does increase insurance and crisis insurance,
partially oﬀsetting the loss of the run. Therefore, for intermediate levels of wealth, the ex-
posed contract may prevail over the covered contract (if q<q 1). However, there is always a
suﬃciently high probability q that can make the exposed banking suboptimal.
25There is always a level of wealth high enough after which covered banking is the optimal
contract. The distortions of covered banking tend to disappear as the bank increases liquidity
insurance and increases investment towards the maximum level of capital attained by ﬁrst-
best solution (k); in contrast, the exposed banking always faces an uninsurable crisis risk that
prevents capital investment to achieve the maximum eﬃcient level.29
4.2 The Dynamics of Wealth, Capital and Consumption
We characterize the dynamics of wealth implied by the optimal banking solution for high risk
aversion (σ>1).30 We assume an initial generation endowed with w0 > 0. When the optimal









(1 − β)[λ(wt−1)γ +1− λ(wt−1)] f(k(wt−1))
(1 − β)γf(k(wt−1))
with probability 1 − η
with probability η
(25)
kt = kj(wt−1):optimal capital choice







if j = c
if j = e
When the optimal banking solution is a covered banking system (j = c), the dynamics of
wealth are deterministic. In contrast, when the optimal banking solution is an exposed banking
system (j = e), the dynamics of wealth are stochastic. When an exposed bank experiences a
run, the full liquidation of the bank porfolio will reduce wealth and investment possibilities of
the following generation.31
29In the limit for inﬁnitely large wealth k
c attains k,w h i l ek







30Early and late consumption (cE and cL) are monotonically increasing in wealth; therefore, as in the case
of autarky, their dynamics follow the dynamics of wealth, and the level of liquidity insurance implied by the
optimal contract.
31It is important to the notice that a higher probability of the sunspot does not necessarily imply lower
growth under optimal banking, since the probability can aﬀect the choice between the two contracts. Under
e x p o s e db a n k i n g ,a ni n c r e a s ei nq would imply lower growth if exposed banking remains the optimal contract;
however, since covered banking has a positive eﬀect on growth, a switch to a covered contract, as a response
to the increase in crisis risk, could have positive growth consequences.
26The following proposition characterizes the generic convergence properties of this economy:
Proposition 4.6 For any initial wealth w0 > 0, the economy with ﬁnancial intermediaries
converges toward a unique stable steady state
_
w
b > 0 and kss = k(
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w







Proof. See Appendix B
Figure 6 illustrates the dynamics for a simulation of the economy. It presents the unique
dynamic paths (F(wt−1)) for autarky, covered banking, and the unconstrained problem. In
contrast, the stochastic growth dynamics for exposed banking is represented by two paths:
Fe (wt−1) if there is no run, and Frun(wt−1) otherwise. The dynamics of the optimal banking
solution are underlined. The steady state is determined by the intersection of the optimal
path with the 45 degree line.





Figure 6: Optimal Banking System and the Growth Dynamics 
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32When the optimal banking system at the steady state is an exposed bank, the economy remains in the
steady-state conditional on no run. To be precise, an exposed banking economy converges to a limit distribution
centered around this point.
27The simulation used in Figure 6 presents the case of an economy with an intermediate
probability of the sunspot (q0 <q<q 1).33 Covered banking is the optimal contract both
for low and high income, and attains a covered-banking steady state. Starting with an initial
low level of wealth, such an economy experiences the fast growth associated with covered
banking, and then switches to an exposed contract, entering the region where crises happen
with positive probability. Eventually, the economy will converge to a long-run, ﬁnancially-safe
steady state. The speed of convergence will depend on the realization of the sunspot. If the
economy receives good draws it will ”escape” rapidly to a run-proof region. If the economy
experiences bad draws, it will experience multiple crises, and yet, it remains optimal to take
on the risk associated with an exposed banking system.
The optimality of covered banking for high levels of wealth is similar to the result of
Acemoglu and Zilibotti [1997]. In their model growth and crises will depend on ”luck”u n t i l
the economy gets rich enough to aﬀord full insurance through broader risk diversiﬁcation. In
our model, the economy is ﬁnancially fragile and vulnerable to bank runs until it becomes
rich enough to aﬀord the cost of a full self-insurance against the risk of liquidity crises.
5 The Consequences of a Banking System
5.1 Liquidity Insurance and the welfare of the current generation
The fundamental source of ineﬃciency under ﬁnancial autarky is the absence of a mecha-
nism for pooling liquidity risk, making necessary that each agent insures herself against such
risk. On the other hand, the bank pools resources and balances the assets’ returns with the
consumers’ ex-ante preference for consumption smoothing between the two possible liquid-
ity needs. Since the bank maximizes expected utility of a current depositor, welfare for the
current generation is necessarily higher than under ﬁnancial autarky.
Proposition 5.1 For any probability of a run and for any level of wealth, the optimal banking
solution dominates autarky for the welfare of the current generation and strictly dominates
autarky for w>k
Proof. This result is independent of the probability q because autarky is a run preventive
contract and thus, covered banking dominates autarky in terms of welfare of the current
generation and stricly dominates for w>k(see Property P6 in Appendix A for a formal
proof).
33The parameters used in the simulation are presented in Appendix D.
285.2 Growth
In this section, we compare the relative growth performance of ﬁnancial autarky and ﬁnancial
intermediation.34 We concentrate on the ﬁnancial intermediation growth performance condi-
tional on the good state of no run, leaving the analysis of output losses caused by liquidity
crises to the next section. The relative growth consequences of the two ﬁnancial regimes can
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where the indexes {a,b} stand for ﬁnancial autarky and the optimal banking system.
Equation (26) can be written in terms of growth rates as:35








Liquidation Eﬀect (A) Investment Eﬀect (B)
The relative growth performance depends on the combination of a liquidation eﬀect (A),
which reﬂects the diﬀerent level of liquidation (λ(w) vs π), and an investment eﬀect (B), which
reﬂects the diﬀerence in capital choice. In terms of growth accounting, the ﬁrst eﬀect reﬂects
a "total factor productivity” gap and the second eﬀect an "investment” gap.
The Liquidation Eﬀect.
Under autarky, self-insurance imposes a constant aggregate liquidation equal to π.I n
contrast, under optimal banking whenever the marginal return of the short asset exceeds the
early liquidation marginal return of the long asset, the bank sets liquidation to zero. These
features represents a technological advantage of banking, that is, its ability to avoid ineﬃcient
liquidation by pooling the liquidity risk. Since the marginal returns, both of capital and
labor, are inversely related with the level of liquidation, its suppression explains why ﬁnancial
intermediaries can attain a higher steady state level of wealth.
For lower levels of wealth, liquidation of the long technology is optimally chosen by the
bank to distribute a fraction of the high returns of this asset to early consumers. When for
low levels of wealth a covered bank is optimal, liquidation in region A equals π (the level of
34For simplicity, we restrict our attention to the most interesting case when σ>1.
35The growth rate of wealth g
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29autarkic aggregate liquidation), and it is gradually reduced to zero. Therefore, the liquidation
eﬀect will favor growth under optimal banking. On the other hand, when exposed banking
is optimal for low levels of wealth, over region A the bank will liquidate a larger proportion
of long term projects (λ∗ >π ). In this case, the liquidation eﬀect initially favors autarky;
however, as liquidation is reduced over region B, the liquidation eﬀect will eventually favor
growth under banking.
The Investment Eﬀect.
For some low levels of wealth (w ∈ [k,w∗]), autarkic agents overinvest in capital as pre-
cautionary savings, while it would be eﬃcient to start investing a fraction of wealth in the
short asset, and reduce liquidation. This ineﬃciency is not present under banking, over region
B, as the banking level of investment is constant. Therefore, over this region, the investment
eﬀect will favor autarky.
Nevertheless, the cost of ineﬃcient liquidation under autarky limits capital investment
for larger levels of wealth, and the investment eﬀect will eventually favor optimal banking.
The reduction of liquidation under banking compensates the decline in the marginal product
of capital due to increasing investment. In region D of the banking economy, investment in
capital is strictly higher than under autarky.36 Therefore there exists a wealth threshold m
in region C at which capital investment in the banking economy and in the autarkic economy
are identical, while for wealth levels higher than m, the investment eﬀect favors the banking
economy. At m, as capital investments are the same in both economies and liquidation is
higher under autarky, growth is strictly higher in the banking economy. The same results
necessarily hold for w>m .T h e r e f o r e :
Proposition 5.2 There exist a level of wealth wa ∈ (k,m) such that for w>w a,g r o w t h
under optimal banking is strictly higher than under ﬁnancial autarky.
Proof. see Appendix B
The intra-generational optimal banking contract maximizes welfare of the current genera-
tion of depositors, without direct concerns on the welfare of future generations or the growth
rate of the economy. Risk-sharing is optimally achieved in an intra-generational sense, but
36To see that, note that in region D (w>e w
c > e w
d) investment in exposed banking is higher than autarky
if and only if q<π(but, this is a necassary condition for exposed banking to be optimal); and, investment in
covered banking is higher that under autarky (propositions (3.1) and (4.2)).
30it may be inter-generationally ineﬃcient, as the bank does not internalize the eﬀect of its
decisions on growth and wealth of future generations of depositors.
The simulation presented in Figure 6 shows an economy for which ﬁnancial intermediation
has a lower rate of growth at early stages of economic development than the autarkic economy.
After the economy has crossed the threshold wa, ﬁnancial intermediation has a strictly growth
enhancing eﬀect.
Figure 6 also illustrates the stage at which the development of a banking system starts to
have crucial long-run eﬀects. When the economy has enough resources to keep an increasing
number of long term projects until full maturity, ﬁnancial intermediation has an increasing
contribution to growth. This result replicates the empirical importance of ﬁnancial intermedi-
ation for the growth perspectives of middle income, or emerging economies. This can explain
why these economies are willing to undertake the risk of an exposed banking system and
increase ﬁnancial vulnerability by developing their ﬁnancial systems.
5.3 Liquidity crises and output losses
An exposed bank is vulnerable to panic runs, and runs impose a cost on the current and future
generations. The ultimate cost of a ﬁnancial crisis is the reduction in welfare it imposes on
consumers of the current, and any subsequent generation that may bear the costs. The
output forgone when there is a crisis is another possible indicator of its cost. However, both
indicators are diﬃcult to estimate empirically. The available empirical information on the
costs of banking crises, reported by De Caprio and Klingebiel [1999], is the ﬁscal cost of those
episodes.
The ﬁscal burden of banking crises does not distinguish which generation is paying for the
rescue of the banking system. In that respect, the relevant variable in our model to compare
with the empirical evidence is the net present value of the output loss of exposed banking
when there is a run. This variable considers the total cost of the crises, and it synthesizes
both the loss of consumption of the current generation, and the reduction in investment (or
wealth) of the next generation. Under the good state of no crisis, an exposed banking system
produces:
y = w − ke +( 1− λe (1 − γ))f (ke).
When there is a bank run, liquidation of all long term assets imply an output of:37
yR = w − ke + γf (ke)
37Let w
0 =wealth of the next generation. The distribution of income between consumption and investment







(1 − λe)(1− γ)
β
(w−ke)
h(ke) +( 1− λe (1 − γ))
The output forgone in case of a run is linked to the liquidity of the banking portfolio. The
more liquid the portfolio, the lower the output cost in case of a crisis, because there is less
ineﬃcient liquidation of long-term projects. The bank provides liquidity by investing in the
short asset (w − k) and by liquidating a proportion λ of long-term projects. The following
table presents the relative output loss for the diﬀerent regions of exposed banking:
Region w − k λ(w) LY

















The relative output loss LY has a humped shape. Poor economies that oﬀer a constant
proportion of liquidity in the form of liquidation, exhibit a constant output loss. Over region B,
there are two eﬀects: ﬁr s t ,a ne x p o s e db a n ks t a r t si n v e s t i n gi nt h el i q u i da s s e t ,w h i c hr e d u c e s
the relative output lost; second, it decreases the optimal liquidation increasing the relative
output lost. The latter eﬀect dominates, and increases of wealth over this region increases
the loss in case of a run. Once an exposed bank stops liquidating the long technology, any
subsequent increase in wealth will be accompanied by an increase in investment in the liquid
asset, thus, reducing the output loss in case of a run.38
is:
y = πcE +( 1− π)cL + w
0 (if there is no run)





R =( 1− β)γf (k)
(if there is a run)
38Except for region B, there is a negative relationship between the output loss and liquidity insurance, since
early consumption is increased using liquid assets.
32Figure 7 depicts the potential output loss for an exposed banking system under diﬀerent
probabilities of the sunspot q. It provides further insight on why middle-income economies
may ﬁnd an exposed banking system optimal, while covered banking is optimal for poor
economies.


























































probability of run =0.01
probability of run =0.1 
probability of run =0.2 
Figure 7: Relative Output Loss and the Level of Wealth 
Over regions A and B, an exposed bank holds the same portfolio independently of having a
higher probability of crises. An increase in q does not increase liquidity as crises self-insurance,
and the only way to limit the consequences of a run is to be covered. In contrast, over regions
C and D, an exposed bank does increase self-insurance through a more liquid portfolio as
an optimal response to higher run risk, reducing the output loss. The humped shape of the
output loss matches the empirical evidence: crises in middle-income economies have higher
costs than poor and rich economies.
336C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we developed an integrated framework to analyze the relationships between
ﬁnancial intermediation, ﬁnancial fragility and growth. This framework is capable of repli-
cating the observed relationship between ﬁnancial development and economic growth, and
between the recurrence and depth of ﬁnancial crises and the level of economic development of
the countries.
To summarize, poor economies have too much to lose in a banking crisis and tend to
prefer to sacriﬁce liquidity insurance for crisis protection; middle income-economies choose to
be vulnerable to crises in exchange for higher liquidity insurance and returns; and ﬁnally rich
economies need a smaller sacriﬁce of liquidity insurance to be fully protected against crises
and avoid any liquidation of long-term projects. By choosing to be vulnerable, middle-income
economies accept the risk of experiencing banking crises. As they get richer, they eventually
converge to a long-run, ﬁnancially-safe steady state. Consequently, the uncertainty on their
growth process introduced by the risk of crises as well as the cost of actual banking crises may
be only a transitory phenomena on the road of their development.
Consistently with the data, we ﬁnd that the development of the banking system in middle-
income economies is associated both with a higher growth and a higher risk of banking crises.
The model is also consistent with the empirical evidence that the output costs of a banking
crisis are more severe for middle-income economies than for poor and rich economies. Finally,
it shows that although there can be short-run growth costs of developing the ﬁnancial system,
there is a positive relationship in the long-run between ﬁnancial development and economic
growth, thus replicating the results of Loayza and Ranciere [2001].
A important variable in our model is the probability of the bad realization of the sunspot,
which in an exposed banking system becomes the actual probability of banking crises. Al-
though it is diﬃcult to assess empirically this probability, there are some estimations of the
unconditional probability of banking crises. Gourinchas, Landerreche and Valdes [2001] us-
ing a 24 year-data set on banking crises, provide an estimate of the probability of banking
crises following episodes of rapid ﬁnancial development ranging between 9.5% and 14%. By
comparison, the most interesting case of intermediate probability in our model -where cov-
ered banking is optimal for poor and rich economies, and exposed banking for middle income
economies- occurs within a range for the probability of a run of 5% to 20%.
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38A The optimal banking system
A.1 Unconstrained optimal risk sharing and bank runs [proof of proposi-
tion (4.1)]
Ab a n kr u ni sr u np r o o fi f : cR
cE ≥ 1. This condition for the four regions of the optimal risk
sharing solution imply:
Region A: cR
cE ≥ 1 ⇔ λ∗ ≤ π.
Region B: cR
cE ≥ 1 ⇔ (β (w − k)+k)(λ∗ − π) ≤ 0 ⇔ λ∗ ≤ π.
Region C: cR
cE ≥ 1 ⇔ cE
cL ≤ γ
Region D: cR
cE ≥ 1 ⇔ γ ≥ 1, (which is impossible since γ<1).
(i) optimal risk sharing is never run proof for σ>1
Region A and B: σ>1 ⇒ λ∗ >π .
Region C: Optimality requires 1 ≤
u0(cE)





since σ>1 ⇒ γ
1
σ >γwhich contradicts the run proof condition.
(ii) Optimal risk sharing solution is run proof only if w ≤ wrpc for σ ≤ 1
Region A and B: σ ≤ 1 ⇒ λ∗ <π , optimal risk sharing is run proof.
Region C: Optimality requires: γ
1
σ ≤ cE
cL ≤ 1,a n dcE
cL = h0 (k)
− 1
σ
since σ ≤ 1 ⇒ γ
1
σ <γ<1. Hence, there exists a unique level of wrp, and a unique capital






A.2 Properties of the Value Functions.
P1: V e(w,q) and V c(w) are continuous, diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave
in w and satisfy Inada Conditions.
P2: V e(w,q) is continuous, diﬀerentiable and strictly decreasing in q.
P3: V c(w) is invariant in q




P5: q>0:V e(w) <Vu(w); lim
w→∞
V e(w,q)
V u(w) < 1 and lim
q→0
V e(w,q)
V u(w) =1 ;a n dq =0: ⇒ V e(w,0) =
V u(w):
39P6 Covered Banking weakly dominates autarky (V c(w) ≥ V a(w)) and stricly dominates
autarky for w>k
— By replicating the autarkic solution (λ = π,k = ka(w)),ab a n ki sc o v e r e d ⇒Covered
Banking weakly dominates autarky
— The solution for the optimal covered bank is unique. Therefore, except when the
autarkic and covered banking solution are identical (w ≤ k), the optimal covered
banking solution stricly dominates autarky.
A.3 The optimal banking system [proof of proposition (4.4)]
The proof ﬁrst proves existence by showing that for extreme values of q (0 and π)t h ec h o i c e
of the optimal contract diﬀers. Uniqueness comes from a single crossing property given by the
properties of the value functions.
• for q =0:V e(w,q)=V u(w) >Vc(w)
• for q = π :covered banking weakly dominates exposed banking.
Under autarky the function to be maximized is
V a (w)=m a x{πu(w − k + γh(k)) + (1 − π)u(w − k + h(k))}
Under a exposed banking, the function to be maximized is
V e (q = π,w)=m a x {(1 − π)[πu(cE)+( 1− π)u(cL)] + πu(w − k + h(k))}
with : πcE +( 1− π)cL ≤ w − k + h(k)
⇒Using Jensen inequality:
[πu(cE)+( 1− π)u(cL)] ≤ u(w − k + h(k))
the optimal solution for exposed bank and autarky for q = π,i m p l i e ske(w) ≤ ka(w) for










V e(w) ≤ V a(w)
40Using P6:
V e(w,π) ≤ V a(w) ≤ V c(w)
for q>πby P2 and P6:V e(w) <Va(w) ≤ V e(w)
By P2 and P3 the cutoﬀ probability q∗(w) is unique, therefore:
q<q ∗(w):V e >Vc
q>q ∗(w):V e <Vc
q = q∗(w):V e = V c
• q∗(w) is implicitly deﬁne by:
V e(w,q∗)=V c(w)
then as V e(w,q∗) and V c(w) are continuous in w and V e(w,q) is continuous in q;h e n c e
q∗(w) is continuous in w
A.4 Optimal Banking and the level of wealth [proof of proposition (4.5)]
The proof proceeds as follows. First we characterize two ranges of wealth: for the ﬁrst range
(poor economies) the cutoﬀ probability is ﬁxed, for some higher levels of wealth, the cutoﬀ
probability is strictly increasing. Second, we show that the two value functions can be at
most crossing in two points (intersections with diﬀerent slope). Hence, for a ﬁxed q there are
three possible cases. No crossing, one crossing and two crossings. Third, we characterize the
implications of the three cases. For any q we show the corresponding case.
Prelimiaries (P7 − P8 are proved at the end of the proof)
P7:for w ≤ e wc it exists a unique q∗
0 invariant in w such that:
q<q ∗





















P8 for e wc <w<min(e we, b wc):q∗(w) is stricly increasing. Let’s e q = q(min(e we, b wc))
For the rest of the proof will will assume q 6= q
∗
0 and describe at the end the special case
q = q∗
0
41By P1 and P4 − P5, the graphs of V e(w) and V c(w,q) can intersect in zero,one or two
points
Let’s ﬁrst characterize the diﬀerent possible cases and show then how they apply to dif-
ferent values of q :
case a: one intersection





case b :two intersections
Let’s call wl and wh, the two point of intersection where they intersect twice








δw . which implies:
w<w l : V e <Vc : covered banking is optimal
wl <w < w h : V e >Vc : exposed banking is optimal
w>w h : V e <Vc : covered banking is optimal
case c: no intersection
By P4 − P5,Ve >Vc for all level of w
Let’s now consider how thoses cases apply for diﬀerent value of q
By P7 and P4 − P5,w h e nq<q ∗
0, case a applies
By P8 and P4 − P5 when q∗
0 <q<e q case b applies
By Proposition (4.4), when q>π , case c applies
Let’s now use the P2 to demonstrate by continuity which cases apply to the remaining
range q ∈]e q,π].
When q continuously decreases, the graph of V b(w,q) continuously shift up when the graph
of V c(w),s t a y si n v a r i a n t .
Therefore by continuity ∃! q1such that:
q1 <q < π : case c applies
e q<q < q 1 : case b applies
q = q1 : V b(w,q) and V c(w) are tangeant
By the same reasonning when there is two intersections points wl,w h : δwl
δq > 0; δwh
δq < 0 .
By P7 − P8, min(e we, b wc) <w l <w h
special case: q = q∗
0 :
42By P7 for w<e wc : V e(w,q∗
0)=V c(w)
When w ≥ e we t h ea n a l y s i si sa sa b o v ea n do v e r]e we,∞) and by P4 − P5, case b applies
on ]e we,∞)
Having demonstrated the relative position of V c(w) and V e(w,q) for all values of q and
all value for w, the proof of proposition is now complete.
Appendix: proofs of P7 − P8
Let : ∆(w,q)=V e(w,q) − V c(w)
for w ≤ k :
∆(w,q)=V e(w,q) − V c(w)=[ V e(1,q) − V c(1)]w1−σ
then:
∆(q∗,w)=0⇔ [V e(1,q) − V c(1)] = 0
then q∗ = q∗
0 is a constant independant of w
for k <w≤ e wc
V c(w)=πu(cE)+( 1− π)u(cL) and as cE = w − k + γh(k) and cL = cE/γ :
V c(w)=u(w − k + γh(k))[π +( 1− π)γσ−1]
V e(w,q)=( 1− q)(πu(cE)+( 1− π)u(cL)) + qu(w − k + γh(k)
and cL = cE/γ1/σ
then:
V e(w,q)=( 1− q)u(cE)[[π +( 1− π)γ
σ−1
σ ]+qu(w − k + γh(k)
but also:
crun = πcE +( 1− π)γcL
crun = cE
h





































u(w − k + γh(k))
And at q = q∗
V e(w,q)=V c(w)



















− [π +( 1− π)γσ−1]
h





for e wc <w≤ min(e w, b wc)
V c(w)=u(w − k + γh(k))[π +( 1− π)γσ−1]
V e(w,q)=
³
(1 − q)[π +( 1− π)γ
σ−1
σ ](π +( 1− π)γ1−1/σ)σ−1 + q
´
u(w − k + γh(k))
so q∗ :










u(w − k + γh(k))
u(w − k + γh(k))

















[π +( 1− π)γσ−1]
with
h





As w increases, k increases in the SBG solution but stay steady in the CWR solution,
u(w − k + γh(k)) increase by less than u(w − k + γh(k))
because (γh0(k) − 1) < 0).
T h e nt h eL H Sw i l lg od o w ns ot or e s t o r ee q u a l i t yt h eR H Sw i l lh a v et od o w na sw e l lw h i c h




B The dynamics of wealth of a banking economy [proof of
proposition (4.6)]
We prove that the growth rate of the economy with the optimal banking system is stricly
decreasing in two steps, ﬁrst within banking systems and then between banking systems when
there is a switch in the optimal banking regime.
Step A: we prove that the growth rates with a covered banking system and with an
exposed banking system are stricly decreasing
growth rate under covered banking
44• region A-B:g0(w) < 0 cf proof of proposition 4.2 in Gaytan-Ranciere (2005) in the special














As h”(k(w)) < 0 and k0(w) > 0= ⇒ g0(w) < 0
• region D:g0(w) < 0 identical to the proof of proposition 3.2 in Gaytan-Ranciere (2005)
growth rate under exposed banking
• region A-B:g0(w) < 0 cf proof of proposition 4.2 in Gaytan-Ranciere (2005) as {ke(w),λ e(w)} =
{ku(w),λ u(w)}
• region C: g0(w) < 0 ⇔ βwk0(w) <k⇔ βw
k0(w)
k < 1



























h(k) ) > (w−k
h(k)) ⇒ βw
k0(w)
k < 1 ⇔ g0(w) < 0
• region D: indentical to the proof of proposition 3.2 in Gaytan-Ranciere (2005)
Step B: we prove that when there is a change in banking regime at wl and wh : g(wl)+ <
g (wl)
− and g(wh)+ <g(wh)
−
• at wh there is a switch from an exposed system to an covered system then:
g(wh)+ <g(wh)
− ⇔ ke(wh) >k c(wh)




After some algebra: δV c
δk
¯ ¯
k=ke(wh) > 0 ⇔ q<πwhich is true as q = q∗(wh) <π
=>ke(wh) >k c(wh) ⇔ g(wh)+ <g(wh)
−
• at wl, by a similar argument, g(wl)+ <g(wl)
−
45C The Consequences of a Banking System [proof of proposi-
tion ( 5.2)]
• Let prove ﬁrst the existence of a wealth threshold m in region C such that ka(m)=kb(m)
and w>m⇒ ka(w) <k b(w)
In region D: ke(w) >k a(w) ⇔ q<πwhich is veriﬁed if an exposed banking system is
optimal
In region D: V c(w) >Va(w) ⇒ kc(w) >k a(w)
In region B: ka(w) >k= ke(w)=kc(w)
Then there exists a threshold m in region C such that ka(m)=kb(m) and w>m⇒
ka(w) <k b(w)
• Let know compare growth in both regimes
In region C and D, λb(w)=0<λ a(w)=π then w ≥ m ⇒ gb(w) >g a(w)
In region A: for σ>1:ka(w)=kb(w)=w and λa(w)=π = λc(w) >λ e(w) ⇒ ga(w) ≥
gb(w)
Then there exists a threshold wa ∈ (k,m) such that w>w a ⇒ gb(w) >g a(w)
D Parameters
The parameters used for simulations are:
Factor productivity A =3
Capital share β = .4
Liquidity needs π = .4
Liquidation value γ = .5
Risk Aversion σ =2
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